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Abstract
Low electoral turnout has become common in many countries. Whether this is a problem for a democracy depends ondamong
other thingsdwhether higher turnout would have made other parties more relevant. This introductory article discusses the findings
and approaches of previous work on this question and summarizes the findings of the work published in this issue. The various
articles, despite using different approaches, looking at different countries and different types of election, all show that any bias
in election outcomes is typically rather small and is not in a specific direction: sometimes the left would benefit from higher turnout,
sometimes other parties. Therefore the concerns about potential bias consequent on low turnout are generally misplaced.
 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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may matter
Countries like Switzerland and the US have long
had turnout rates below 50% for national elections,
but in recent years low turnout in national elections
has become much more widespread. Blais et al.
(2004) and Gray and Caul (2000) found a downward
trend in national election turnout, and countries such
as the UK and Finland, which appeared to have resisted
this trend, have experienced a sudden drop in turnout in
recent national elections. Most countries also have sec-
ond-order contests such as European Parliament elec-
tions or local elections with particularly low turnout
rates.
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E-mail addresses: georg.lutz@ipw.unibe.ch (G. Lutz), mmarsh@
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doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2006.10.001As turnout falls, concerns about the functioning of
democracy are rising. In a much cited article based on
his 1996 APSA Presidential address Arend Lijphart
calls low turnout a serious democratic problem and de-
mocracy’s ‘‘unresolved dilemma’’ (Lijphart, 1997, 1),
the reason being that it makes the operation of electoral
democracy unequal: some voices are heard and others
are silent. In the eyes of many democratic theorists
(Barber, 1984; Pateman, 1970) participation is essential
for democracy and there is a general feeling among
many politicians and political commentators that high
turnout is important for democracies. It is suggested
that the legitimacy of democracy in general and the out-
comes of elections in particular are undermined when
many citizens do not participate (Cavanagh, 1981, 62;
Salisbury, 1975, 326).
While these observations stem in part from a norma-
tive commitment to participation in general and voting
in particular per se, they also stem from the assumption
that, in Lijphart’s terms, if they were to speak the
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‘heard’. It is this aspect of the possible consequences
of low turnout that are the main focus of this special is-
sue. More specifically, we look at whether turnout mat-
ters for the outcome of the political process, especially
elections. It should not simply be assumed that the pref-
erences of the non-voters are any different than the pref-
erences of the voters and hence greater or even full
turnout would make a difference.
The standard view is that low turnout produces
a class bias in electoral outcomes. Most studies of par-
ticipation have found that socio-economic status (SES)
is strongly correlated to participation. Education, in-
come, age and sometimes gender are highly significant
predictors of whether somebody voted (Franklin,
2002; Norris, 2002, 83ff). If it is assumed that the po-
litical system listens more closely to the voices of
those who participate, unequal turnout spells unequal
influence of the less-well-do citizens (Lijphart, 1997,
1; Verba et al., 1995, 11). Because low SES voters
traditionally voted for left wing socialist and social
democratic parties, low turnout should lead to a bias
against left wing parties and left wing policies in
consequence.
At this point it is sensible to review the nature of the
puzzle we are trying to solve. We want to find out if low
turnout is a problem and we assume that it would be
a problem if higher levels of turnout would bring differ-
ent election or policy outcomes. More particular varia-
tions of this question focus on the more specific or
directional possibility that left-of-centre parties would
do better if turnout increased, as well as how big the
difference would bedwhether they would be suffi-
ciently substantial to have effects on government for-
mation or policy outcomesdand whether we can
predict under which situational and institutional cir-
cumstances turnout effects are a factor that is to be
reckoned with. Another variation of this question
would be to explore what would happen if turnout
was to be (even) lower than the current level in an elec-
tion (see van der Eijk and van Egmond, in this issue).
Given declining turnout in many countries, this ques-
tion might be of even more practical relevance than
the question of what would happen if turnout would
rise in low-turnout countries.
There are three different underlying aspects of the
general problem and they are not of necessity related:
(1) Do voters have different party or policy preferences
when compared to non-voters; (2) Does lower turnout
favour, or harm, some parties; and (3) What would hap-
pen if turnout were to rise, or fall (Grofman et al., 1999).
We are interested primarily in the third question. As thisis a counterfactual it can be approached only in terms of
questions one and two.
Many studies take the first approach and compare
preferences of voters and non-voters. They assume
that if the party preferences of the average abstainer
are different from those of the average voter, then less
than complete turnout will have some impact on the out-
come of the election. If, on the other hand, abstainer
preferences mirror voter preferences, then the level of
voter turnout will have no consequences for the election
outcome. This argument is flawed (Grofman et al.,
1999). When we observe differences between the party
preferences of voters and non-voters we cannot logi-
cally assume that somewhat higher turnout would fa-
vour the party that is underrepresented among the
voters. It is not necessarily true that turnout that is a little
higher than the current level would benefit the under-
represented party. Higher turnout could mean that addi-
tional supporters of the already ‘overrepresented’ party
will vote and that potential supporters of the ‘underrep-
resented’ party will still remain at home.
Nor do we know how stable are the preferences of
the non-voters. Non-voters’ preferences might change
if they participated. They might then be more informed.
Alternatively, their involvement might result from
a change in preferences. Any change in election out-
come in the direction of the preferences of erstwhile
non-voters is only likely under the assumption that the
preferences of the non-voters would not change if
they voted (Grofman et al., 1999, 360).
Of course there are other possible worries about low
turnout, which are not directly related to electoral and
policy outcomes (and which are not subject of this
special issue). Low turnout may be problematic for
democratic legitimacy because it may be a sign of dis-
satisfaction with democracy. In fact, much evidence
suggests that dissatisfaction is not the main motive for
non-voting. Many non-voters are fairly satisfied with
how democracy works (Bennett and Resnick, 1990).
Citizens do not vote either because they cannot (they
lack the resources or capacity), or because they do not
want to (they lack motivation) or because nobody asked
them (mobilisation) (Verba et al., 1995, 3). Much non-
voting appears to stem from a lack of interest in, indif-
ference towards and ignorance of elections or politics in
general (Ragsdale and Rusk, 1993; Plane and Gershten-
son, 2004). Politics is far from being a primary concern;
family and friends, work and leisure matter much more
for most people’s everyday lives. The experience of two
countries with notoriously low turnout, Switzerland and
the US, moreover show that low turnout is not necessar-
ily related to political instability. On this account there
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racy in crises.
2. Low turnout and its consequences
We can distinguish between direct and indirect ef-
fects of low turnout. Direct effects occur when higher,
or lower, turnout would lead to an election outcome
than that with the current level of turnout. Indirect
effects happen when elites lean their policies towards
the voters and ignore the needs of the non-voters. While
most studies assume a connection, these two effects are
not necessarily connected. Even if there is a partisan
bias due to low turnout, policy makers might neverthe-
less take the needs of the non-voters into account. The
reverse may also be true: even if there is no observed
partisan bias in low turnout elections, policies can be
skewed in favour of the preferences of those who vote
while those who do not are largely ignored.
2.1. Direct effects on outcomes
The articles in this special issue concentrate on the
direct links between the outcomes of elections and pop-
ular votes and turnout. Much of the attention this ques-
tion has received in the literature is directed at analysing
the relation between election turnout and left-of-centre
party (or candidate, as the case may be) vote share. It is
assumed that people with lower socio-economic status
tend to be less educated and less participative than the
middle class; the latter, in contrast, tend to support
more right-leaning parties. In addition, in the United
States, but arguably not only there, this bias takes on
ethnic and racial dimensions. Blacks, for example,
who on average have lower socio-demographic status
than whites, tend to support Democratic candidates,
but they abstain at higher rates than middle-class whites
(Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980, 90e91; Verba and
Nie, 1972, 170e171). Similarly, educational attainment
is positively correlated with voting propensity (Avey,
1989; Burnham, 1987; Piven and Cloward, 1989; Wolf-
inger and Rosenstone, 1980). While this logic is argu-
ably most applicable to low turnout countries such as
the United States, where socio-demographic differences
in participation are particularly pronounced, a class-
bias in turnout has been reported for other countries
and regions in the world as well (e.g. Dalton, 2002,
49e51). It appears to follow then, that if more people
voted, left-of-centre parties and candidates would fare
better in elections than they do at present.
One approach to resolving the question of who loses
and who benefits from low turnout involves regressingthe vote share of left-of-centre parties and candidates
on aggregate turnout and a variety of control variables.
This strategy has been used in relation to presidential,
gubernatorial, senatorial, and House elections in the
United States with mixed results. Radcliff (1994,
1995) claims that the Democratic vote share in presi-
dential elections increases with voter turnout. However,
Erikson (1995a,b) argues that proper specification of
Radcliff’s statistical models shows the relation between
turnout and presidential Democratic vote share to be in-
distinct. Nagel and McNulty (1996) find that the rela-
tion between turnout and Democratic vote share in
gubernatorial and senatorial races has varied over
time, sometimes in a manner beneficial to Republican
candidates, sometimes to Democrats, but most of the
time just being statistically insignificant. Focussing on
US House elections, DeNardo (1980) found that there
is a conditional positive relationship between turnout
and Democratic vote share (see also Tucker et al.,
1986), but that the more important consequence of
increased turnout is to harm the incumbent. For the
rest of the world, Pacek and Radcliff (1995) find, in
a cross-national study of advanced industrialised coun-
tries, that the vote share of left-leaning political parties
increases with voter turnout. Similar findings have been
made for cross-national surveys of developing countries
(Aguilar and Pacek, 2000) and of post-communist
countries in Central and Eastern Europe (Bohrer
et al., 2000), as well as in single-country studies for
Australia (McAllister, 1986), Britain (McAllister and
Mughan, 1986), New Zealand (Nagel, 1988).
Studies using this approach estimate the political ef-
fect of differential turnout by pooling across a large col-
lection of elections. It is reasonable to suppose, as Nagel
and McNulty (1996) do, that turnout effects, if they ex-
ist, should be observable in election outcomes. Rather
than rely on questionnaire-based information about
the attitudes of voters and non-voters, this multiple-
election regression approach examines the patterns in
election results for evidence of turnout effects. How-
ever, it has been argued that this aggregate-level ap-
proach obscures the individuals who make voting
choices and thus ignores the possibility that individ-
ual-specific factors may influence voting and abstention
behaviour. The fact that elections reflect individual
choices is thus easily lost (Herron, 1998, 6). Further-
more, there is an ecological inference problem inherent
in the multiple-election regression approach to estimat-
ing turnout effects. Researchers cannot know the types
of individuals that abstain in a given set of elections and
must instead work solely with abstention rates. And
while turnout rates in a group of elections may be
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individuals abstaining are necessarily the same in each
of the elections (Grofman et al., 1999; Herron, 1998, 6e
7). The appeals made by the same parties may well vary
over time, and in fact the character of any party might
well vary. This will increase the chance of different
groups abstaining at different times, and thus increase
the chance of biased inferences. A further problem
with this approach is that when we study elections
within the same country over time we cannot know
from aggregate figures how many individual voters
have changed their minds between two elections and
how many of the potential voters have voted in both
election. The expansion of the studies over time further
increases the difficulties. The fact that individual-level
studies have tended to produce negative findings (dis-
cussed below) while some aggregate-level regression
models find positive correlations between turnout and
left-of-centre vote share should alert us all the more to
the potential gravity of the ecological inference
problem.
The second approach to estimating turnout effects
uses survey data as a basis for simulating the outcome
were turnout to be higher, or lower. There are many
ways in which this can be done. However, there is
a general methodological challenge stemming from
the sampling bias in survey research: survey respon-
dents tend to vote at a higher rate than the real popula-
tion. Two reasons are responsible for the over
sampling. Non-voters tend to be more difficult to inter-
view and some non-voters claim in surveys that they in
fact have voted. The first problem can be tackled using
weighting techniques in the analysis. The second is
more difficult to control. In some countries, like the
US, it is possible to correct for this bias because
whether a survey respondent actually voted or not
can be validated. But in most other countries it is not
possible to validate reports of voting. What are the ex-
pected consequences of this sampling bias? One conse-
quence is that we may exaggerate differences between
voters and non-voters because we may have actual
non-voters among the reported voters in a sample. In
other words, we are more likely to find possible turnout
effects that we would be if our data were to be vali-
dated. However, the bias might be counteracted by an
opposing bias. We can assume that the most discon-
nected and transient members of the electorate do not
tend to respond to surveys. If this is the case, it leads
to a countervailing effect as we then underestimate
differences between voters and non-voters. Thus, in
general the problem of bias in survey data may not
be severe.Using survey data and comparing party or candidate
choices of voters with measured or simulated prefer-
ences of the non-voters allows some conclusions to be
drawn about the possible consequences of higher turn-
out (Lutz, 2006). Using data from the 1988 American
National Election Study, Herron (1998) found that the
Democrat presidential candidate, Dukakis, would have
almost certainly won the election if turnout had been
100%. In a similar analysis Citrin et al. (2003) use
state-level exit polls and census data to estimate the par-
tisan preferences of non-voters in Senate elections and
then simulate the outcome of these elections under uni-
versal turnout. They find that while non-voters are gen-
erally more democratic than voters, the scarcity of close
races means that very few election outcomes would
have changed had everyone voted. Thus, although their
results suggest that Democrats would fare better in a va-
riety of alternative turnout scenarios, including full
turnout of various ethnic, racial and income groups,
few elections would actually have produced a different
winner. The last word from this approach to date is
a study that estimates the impact of differential turnout
on the outcome of presidential elections from 1952 to
2000 using data from the National Election Study
(NES) (Brunell and DiNardo, 2004). Their estimates
are in line with the above findings that non-voters are,
on average, slightly more likely to support the Demo-
cratic Party. Of the 13 presidential elections between
1952 and 2000 in only twodthose of 1980 and
2000dwas the lead of the winning party sufficiently
narrow that a different final outcome would have been
likely. This has been reconfirmed recently by Martinez
and Gill (2005).
Tóká (2002) extends this approach to a multitude of
countries and elections. Using the June 2000 version of
the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) in-
tegrated micro-level data set, Tóka analyses turnout ef-
fects (alongside information effects) on outcomes of
eighteen elections in as many countries. With this de-
sign he seeks to take into account the extent to which
turnout effects may vary with political and institutional
context. He reasons that varying correlations of party
alignments with social cleavage lines or aspects of the
institutional-electoral design may all firstly, influence
the extent to which socially unequal turnout occurs in
a given polity at a particular time, and secondly, then
impacts on electoral outcomes. In order to model these
factors explicitly, Tóka simulates election results pro-
jected on various counterfactual scenarios including
100% turnout, and then examines whether and to what
extent the simulated election results would have sys-
tematically increased the weight on election outcomes
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showing below-average political involvement for rea-
sons other than their political preferences (Tóká,
2002, 13e14). Tóka’s analysis reveals only a small
change, on average, in left-of-centre party fortunes if
turnout increased to 100%, result which he explains in
terms of the overlap between the demographic corre-
lates of vote choice and participation (Tóká, 2002, 38).
With its focus on individual elections, this approach
allows for the important possibility that differential
turnout effects may vary from election to election
within one country, as well as between countries. How-
ever, there are limitations of this methodology. While it
is useful to combine the advantages of individual-level
analysis with the enhanced certainty and validity of ac-
tual behaviour and election results, this approach is re-
stricted either to analysing one election at a time
(Herron, 1998), to several elections of the same type
and in one country for reasons of statistical control
(Brunell and DiNardo, 2004; Citrin et al., 2003) or to
modelling the effects of only a very small vector of vari-
ables which influence vote choice (Tóká, 2002). Thus,
these studies must forgo either the ability to distinguish
systematic and general turnout effects from the situa-
tional effects on voting behaviour, trends that persist
across a large number of countries and elections, or
the capacity to include more than a handful of variables
in their model. Ideally we need an analysis of a hetero-
geneous sample of polities and elections if we are to
generalise reliably about turnout effects in any election
(Tóká, 2002, 24).
Parties may also respond to unequal participation: if
some groups vote more than others, we could expect
parties to adjust and put more efforts into mobilizing
and targeting groups that are favourable disposed and
show signs of higher turnout. There is evidence in US
elections, for example, that parties do precisely this:
they strategically direct their canvassing efforts to
groups with higher turnout rates and higher probabili-
ties to vote for their party (Wielhouwer, 1995). In the
US black voters are less likely to be contacted by the
Republican Party (Wielhouwer, 2000). Similarly parties
canvass in districts where their support is fairly high and
leave out districts with only little support for their
parties (Huckfeld and Sprague, 1992). Studies have
also found that people with higher socio-economic
status are more likely to be contacted by parties than
those from disadvantaged groups (Gershtenson, 2003)
and younger voters are also less likely to be contacted
(Wattenberg, 2003).
For actual voters, the mobilizing efforts of parties
can have two different effects and these two effectscan also be combined. The first is the effect mobilisa-
tion has on turnout and the second is the effect mobili-
sation has on the direction of a vote. Studies (mainly in
the US) have not yet shown clear results. While some
studies find that mobilisation has an effect on turnout,
though not on the direction of the vote (Caldeira
et al., 1985, 1990; Cox, 1999; Jackson, 1996, 1997;
Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Wielhouwer and Lock-
erbie, 1994), other studies find a smaller effect on turn-
out and argue that the main effect is on the direction of
the vote (Huckfeld and Sprague, 1992; Whitely and
Seyd, 1994). If campaigning has a positive effect on
turnout we can expect reinforcing consequences:
some groups participate more because they are mobi-
lized and because they participate more they are con-
tacted by parties too. Very little research has been
done on this outside the US but this question is beyond
the focus of this special issue.
2.2. Indirect effects on policies and campaigns
While some kind of differential turnout can be ex-
pected to have some direct consequences for policy,
via government formation, there may also be important
indirect effects. These effects are indirect because they
stem from the behaviour of political elites in response to
historical and hence anticipated inequalities in political
participation. If some groups are over-represented and
others under-represented, this could imply that ‘‘public
officials hear more from some kinds of citizens than
from others and thus jeopardize the democratic norm
of equal protection of interests’’ (Verba et al., 1995,
493). When participation is biased in terms of politi-
cally relevant characteristics, such as race or income,
then policy outcomes may also be biased. If political
elites pay more attention to the policy preferences and
policy agendas of the voters, and if non-voters have dif-
ferent policy preferences and policy agendas, this will
result in preferences of non-voters being systematically
neglected, or at least getting a lower weighting in any
democratic calculus. However, there is a counter argu-
ment. This is that political elites have to take into ac-
count the policy preferences and agendas of non-
voters because if they do not care enough about them,
these people will show up at the next elections and
may vote them out!
One way to examine the potential policy effects of
non-voting is to compare political preferences of voters
and non-voters. Many studies find little or no difference
between the policy preferences of voters and non-voters
in opinion polls (Shaffer, 1982; Teixeira, 1992; Wolf-
inger and Rosenstone, 1980, for the United States,
544 G. Lutz, M. Marsh / Electoral Studies 26 (2007) 539e547and Studlar and Welch, 1986 for Great Britain). Gant
and Lyons (1993) did find statistically significant differ-
ences but did so with respect to less than one-third of
policy preference scales. Of the eleven issue dimensions
on which voters and non-voters reflected statistically
significant differences, eight were social welfare issues,
and on all eight of these non-voters were more left-wing
than voters. At the very least, they conclude, this sug-
gests the possibility that increased electoral turnout of
non-voters could lead to a different composition of
the political agenda, or to a set of more left wing options
on existing issues, thereby decreasing any class bias in
voting and public policy (Gant and Lyons, 1993, 200).
Bennett and Resnick (1990), although finding that the
differences in policy positions are quite low, also find
that there are significant differences on some domestic
issues, mainly those dealing with spending on welfare
programs (p. 771). But Highton and Wolfinger (2001)
find no differences in most policy areas, with the excep-
tion of welfare policies.
All of these studies contrast the opinions of voters
and non-voters. They do not deal directly with elite
behaviour, or the fact that the existence of differences
between the policy preferences of voters and non-voters
does not necessarily mean that elites respond to those
differences when making policy. However, an associa-
tion between turnout and elite behaviour has been
made by Hill and Leighley (1992), who find a negative
relationship between an upper class bias in turnout and
the generosity of indigenous state social welfare spend-
ing (see also Hill et al., 1995; Hill and Leighley, 1996;
Ringquist et al., 1997). A similar result comes from
a study by Hicks and Swank (1992), who find a positive
link between levels of turnout and the welfare efforts of
governments in western democracies. Mueller and
Stratmann (2003) also find links between participation
and income distribution; the higher participation is in
a country, the more redistributive are policies (although
at the price of lower total income and reduced economic
growth). Most recently Martin (2003) found that in the
US counties with higher turnout receive larger amounts
of federal expenditure.
3. New findings of the articles
The main finding of this volume is that turnout does
not matter a great deal, no matter what method, dataset
or period of time the authors apply. The various contri-
butions each demonstrate that overall effects are mini-
mal. Where they can be observed, they do not point in
the originally expected direction that low turnout harms
left-of-centre parties. We can conclude that one of themain worries about low turnout expressed by Lijphart
(1997) among others is not born out in empirical
analysis.
The articles vary in the types of elections and coun-
tries explored, thus broadening the debate beyond the
largely Anglo-American basis of most previous
research. General elections in Norway, the UK and
Canada, referendums in Switzerland and European
Parliament elections are all explored, while there are
also three extensive comparative studies of general
elections.
The contributions vary in the approaches used to ex-
plore the consequences of low turnout. Each of the
broad strategies discussed above are used. One ap-
proach focuses mainly on individuals. Most of our arti-
cles use opinion surveys to consider whether voters and
non-voters differ in any significant way on the dimen-
sion of partisan choice but employ a variety of sur-
vey-based evidence, which they use in different ways.
Van der Eijk and van Egmond use a direct question to
ask about voting in a hypothetical coincident election
to explore the impact of low turnout in European parlia-
ment elections and Lutz uses a similar survey question
to explore the impact of differential turnout in Swiss
referenda. Pettersen and Rose use a party thermometer
question to probe the partisan consequences of higher
mobilisation among non-voters while Bernhagen and
Marsh treat the probable vote choice of non-voters as
missing data to be inferred from the covariation of the
choices of those who did report a vote and their political
preferences and socio-demographic characteristics. Fi-
nally, Rubenson et al. examine the policy preference
of non-voters as one way of assessing vote choice.
In contrast to this individual level approach, a second
method involves regressing the vote share of left-of-
centre parties and candidates on aggregate turnout and
a variety of control variables. As already noted, this
strategy has been used in relation to US elections and
in cross-national studies. Fisher explores this relation-
ship using both a cross-country time series framework
as well as making use of UK constituency level data
across a substantial time period and the set of European
Parliament elections.
Pettersen and Rose explore the effects of somewhat
higher turnout in high turnout elections and van der
Eijk and van Egmond look at the effects of declining
turnout while the other survey-based articles consider
full turnout, or changes up to full turnout. As discussed
above, counterfactual estimates of the effects of more
modest turnout increases and decreases should not as-
sume that a random process determines which addi-
tional voters participate and which voters drop out.
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pate vary a lot and that there is not always a linear rela-
tionship between the different social and political
characteristics and probability of voting. Bernhagen
and Marsh also take into account different probabilities
of voting by way of the stepwise addition of ever less
likely voters.
While the methods and data employed in these arti-
cles vary, the conclusions reached do not. The articles
all agree that possible increases and decreases in turn-
out have little impact on election results. There is no
significant bias against the left that would be redressed
if only turnout were higher. We can look at these con-
clusions in a little more detail, taking the comparative
articles first. Bernhagen and Marsh concentrate on ef-
fects of 100% turnout on electoral outcomes and con-
clude that they would be small for the most part. Not
surprisingly, the biggest effects tend to be found where
turnout is lowest The main beneficiaries of full turnout
would be small parties and non-incumbent parties but
in most cases the ‘winners’ remained unchanged and
the gains of the smallest parties might still leave
them without parliamentary representation. Van der
Eijk and van Egmond come to a similar conclusion
that effects are generally weak although they examine
a smaller range of turnout variation, contrasting turn-
out in European Parliament elections with that in gen-
eral elections. Both articles point out that while
differential turnout can and in some instances does
have very significant consequences, such cases are rel-
atively rare. In contrast to Bernhagen and Marsh, van
der Eijk and van Egmond find no systematic pattern
of winners and losers and they conclude that turnout
effects are largely idiosyncratic. Fisher switches the fo-
cus to aggregate data and draws on a broad range of
comparative data sets. He concludes that while there
is superficial support from an OECD data set for the
proposition that left parties do better where turnout is
higher, the proposition that such parties would do bet-
ter if turnout were higherdor worse if it felldcould
not be sustained since there was no link between
change in turnout levels and change in the left share
of the vote. Analysis of European Parliament election
results confirmed that pattern, in contrast to earlier re-
sults obtained by Pacek and Radcliff (2003) whose
methodology is criticised by Fisher. Moreover, Fisher’s
extensive analysis of British data also reinforced the
weakness of the simple link between left party strength
and higher turnout. If these findings are all generally
negative, they nonetheless run counter to a widespread
acceptance of the positive link between turnout and left
leaning forces.The articles by Rubenson, Blais, Gidengill, Nevitte
and Fournier and by Pettersen and Rose both limit the
analysis to a particular country. Rubenson et al use Ca-
nadian data to explore differences between voters and
non-voters and, using policy measures to estimate likely
partisanship, find scant evidence for the contention that
voters and non-voters hold different views and that elec-
tion outcomes would be very different with full turnout.
Differences between actual outcomes and those simu-
lated under full turnout were typically less than 2%,
even for the larger parties.
In contrast to the paper by Rubenson et al., Pettersen
and Rose, like van der Eijk and van Egmond (and
Fisher) are concerned primarily with the impact on
the result of turnout by those that might have been ex-
pected to vote, rather than all non-voters. They find, us-
ing data from Norwegian national election studies, that
nothing much would have changed and that there is lit-
tle sign of differential turnout by the supporters of a par-
ticular party having a significant impact on the
outcome. Their results echo those of Bernhagen and
Marsh and van der Eijk and van Egmond in showing
that falling levels of turnout in practice do seem to cre-
ate more opportunity for differential turnout to mani-
fest itself, but also reaffirm the conclusions of other
articles that turnout effects are generally slight. They
also find no evidence that larger parties, more extreme
parties or smaller parties would benefit from a some-
what higher turnout. In short, the idea that there are sig-
nificant pockets of easy-to-mobilise potential support
for party leaders to exploit gets no support from this
article.
Rosema’s article also takes a comparative approach
but focuses more on the way voters make their decisions
and the implications of this for our understanding of the
functions of elections. He explores whether turnout
levels have implications for the relative distribution of
different types of voters: those who hold the govern-
ment accountable or those who vote on ideological
grounds as opposed to those whose choice seems
more idiosyncratic. The first two types of voters illus-
trate the working of the classic accountability and man-
date functions of elections while the third fulfils only
the democratic norm of involvement and participation,
perhaps at the expense of the other two. Rosema finds
that the impact of levels of turnout on the active elector-
ate in these terms is slight. However, the fact that ac-
countability and ideologically patterned voting is
slightly more common when turnout is low suggests
that the consequences of lower turnout are not uni-
formly gloomy from the perspective of the democratic
function of elections.
546 G. Lutz, M. Marsh / Electoral Studies 26 (2007) 539e547Finally, Lutz shifts the focus from electoral democ-
racy to direct democracy by looking at the impact of
differential turnout on Swiss referendums. He also
adds information to the mix. He finds evidence of
a turnout bias in the outcome of popular votes but
shows this is not large, and is smaller in the more ‘im-
portant’ votes. Even so, the outcome of some close and
important votes could have been different with higher
turnout. He does not find any general bias against the
more ‘left-wing’ options. Information enters the equa-
tion in an interesting manner. Non-voters tend to have
less information and are more right wing in their views.
Hence higher turnout might benefit the right. However,
more informed voters are more left wing and, arguably,
higher turnout could only be achieved (short of com-
pulsory voting) by raising interest and information. If
so, higher turnout might then benefit the right much
less and perhaps the left rather more than might be ex-
pected on a simple comparison of voters and non-
voters. This last article raises the question explicitly
of how turnout is to be raised and whether or not the
process of increasing turnout might in itself change
our estimates of how people might vote. Lutz suggests
that, to the extent that information matters in mobilisa-
tion, we may underestimate the impact of increased
turnout and so indicates at least one path for further
research in this area.
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